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THE HYDRAULICS AND POLITICS OF PARTY REGULATION: 
A SUPRALEGAL THEORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Michael S. Kang*
Swept up in the growing “constitutionalization” of the law of democracy,
political parties today are the centerpieces of American law and politics.
However, even sophisticated legal scholars adhere to a formalistic view of
political parties as discrete, legally defined entities.  This article topples
this conventional view of political parties.  Drawing from recent research
in political science, this article presents a more realistic deconstruction of
political parties and how they operate in American democracy.  The article
argues that “parties” are merely a colloquial shorthand for bundles of
political relationships, constituting fluid, informal arrangements that defy
and transcend legal definition.  Parties, as such, are fundamentally
political, rather than legal, creatures that represent pragmatic, interactive
responses to law, regulation, and political circumstances.  Their supralegal
character massively complicates party regulation and reform, as party
leaders can avoid regulation by adapting their informal arrangements.
Party regulation, in turn, too often springs from efforts by party actors to
skew the terms of political competition that govern themselves and their
rivals, both within and outside their party.  A supralegal theory of political
parties thus recognizes that party reforms are more likely to advance the
narrow political aims of advantaging certain factions than they are to
achieve the broader reform goals deployed to justify regulation.  This fact
demands judicial skepticism about party regulation and the promised
benefits of party reforms. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Never before have political parties received such sustained attention from courts,
commentators, and legislators.  In recent years, the Supreme Court has decided important
cases dictating the proper role of political parties in all facets of American politics.1  This
development has forced the legal scholarship, in response, to debate the proper legal
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characterization of political parties in the wake of the various decisions covering the
spectrum of political activity.2  The growing “constitutionalization” of the law of democracy
promises to keep the status of political parties squarely before the courts in the years to
come.3
This article challenges the fundamental assumption underlying every judicial
decision addressing political parties.  The assumption is that parties matter as legal creatures
and  exist in the way that an individual or a corporation possesses a legal identity, persona,
and interests.  The conventional approach in law, as a result, addresses political parties as
discrete entities comprising the legally identifiable actors within the official party apparatus,
such as officeholders, party committees, and official party organizations. 
Drawing upon political science, the article demonstrates that this fundamental
assumption is wrong.   The article argues that, for purposes of understanding how political
parties interact with the law, parties are best understood in political terms, in “supralegal”
terms transcending their legal structure and identity.  The term “party” is a colloquial
shorthand to describe the bundle of informal relationships that a much broader political
coalition can be said to encompass.  The political party is best understood as a loose
collection of political relationships, some legal and some nonlegal, among a diverse set of
actors and institutions, all of whom perform important work in furtherance of a common
general agenda.  
This article thus proposes a new conception of the political party, moving away
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from the formalistic notion of parties as legally defined entities, to a more robust, more
realistic supralegal model of parties and how they function in practice.  All types of private
actors, who may or may not possess legally cognizable connections to the official party
apparatus, are important members of the party coalition, including unions, interest groups,
think tanks, and other politically active groups.  These political leaders organize and operate
through the official party structure only when it serves their overlapping interests. 
This new supralegal framework for understanding political parties reveals that party
regulation often conceives of parties in terms that are either too narrow or too broad.  First,
an unduly narrow focus on the political party as consisting of its legally identifiable actors
obscures the “hydraulics of party regulation.”4  Party regulation, designed to influence the
practice of politics more broadly, restricts only a fraction of the resources, opportunities, and
activity at the disposal of the party.  When law prevents leaders from pursuing their interests
through the legal apparatus of the political party, they divert their strategic activity into less
public, less regulated channels.  Like water, the party seeks a hydraulic return to its own
level of influence, finding gaps and openings in the regulatory edifice whether they exist in
the public or private domain.  Party regulation may influence the way that parties operate,
shifting them from first-best to second-best strategies, but it does so at social cost by driving
important party activity into less public and less transparent venues.
Second, there is a significant risk of conceptualizing political parties too broadly.
Political parties are defined by a fundamental internal tension that brings together individual
leaders for common goals, at the same time that each leader competes for relative influence
within the party coalition.  There is constant intraparty competition to control the direction
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  Party leaders exert enormous influence in determining what party regulation is enacted by the state
because party leaders “routinely, pervasively, and legitimately exercise their influence from within government.”
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 Tex. L. Rev.
1741, 1758 (1993).  
of the party coalition.  When party regulation succeeds, as it does on occasion, it is too often
results fromthe “politics of party regulation,” essentially political disputes among intraparty
rivals.5  Party regulation, when enacted, influences the means through which the party
works, and by doing so, it shifts the balance of power within and among party leaderships.
In other words, party regulation, and subsequent litigation over it, usually stems from efforts
by party actors to defeat their political rivals.  Party reforms are more likely to achieve these
narrow political objectives than larger reform goals.  
This new supralegal conception of political parties provides a new lens for viewing
and making sense of the Supreme Court’s decisions on party regulation.  It counsels courts
to be highly skeptical about promised reform benefits as they navigate the hydraulics and
politics of party regulation.  A proper understanding of parties illuminates party-related
cases as exercises in political management of the myriad relationships that parties comprise.
Contrary to the legal commentary, I argue that a set of Court decisions striking down
regulation of party primary elections were correctly decided, if not correctly reasoned.  I
show that such judicial skepticism about party regulation produces a counterintuitive but
healthy effect of encouraging political resolution of intraparty disagreements. 
In Part II, I set forth the conventional legal understandings of political parties and
party regulation.  In Part III, I challenge those understandings as fundamentally problematic.
I first explain the risk of conceptualizing the party too narrowly.  Courts and commentators
fail to recognize the hydraulics of party regulation.  The hydraulics of party regulation posit
that party leaders, when they are unified, can frustrate party reform.
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I then explain the opposite risk of conceptualizing the party too broadly.  Viewing
the party as a unified coalition overlooks the politics of party regulation—vital intraparty
conflict that often motivates party regulation and party-related litigation.  The politics of
party regulation reveal reform as part of ongoing political rivalry among party leaders.  I
introduce Court decisions addressing state regulation of party primaries and demonstrate
how they resulted from intraparty competition.  
In Part IV, I argue that a supralegal understanding of parties justifies judicial
skepticism about party regulation, specifically regulation of party internal affairs, structure,
and decisionmaking.  I explain that courts in party regulation cases are managing the
political dynamics among interested political actors, rather than acting upon a unitary
political party.  Judicial skepticism about party regulation is more likely to encourage
political resolution of partisan disputes, and it is more effective in achieving this goal than
judicial abstention.  
To close, I demonstrate how the Court’s handling of the party primary cases can be
understood afresh as successful political management.  The Court rehabilitated the
relationships at the heart of those cases, notwithstanding the fact that its express rationales
and the scholarly response overlooked these benefits.  
II. POLITICAL REFORM AND THE APPEAL OF PARTY REGULATION
It is no mystery why political reform so often resorts to the regulation of political
parties.  Parties are a pervasive feature of American politics, involved in virtually every
aspect of government.6  They recruit candidates, operate campaigns, and mobilize voters.
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7 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Role of the Democratic and Republican Parties as Organizers of Shadow
Interest Groups, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1990) (contending that “party membership remains a sine qua non for
becoming elected to political office in the United States”); John F. Bibby & Thomas M. Holbrook, Parties and
Elections, in Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis 66, 67 (Virginia Gray et al. eds., 7th ed.
1999) (reporting that since 1950, only five people were elected governor as independents or minor party
candidates, and in 1998, only twenty state legislators out of 7375 (.003 percent) were not Republicans or
Democrats). 
8 See Frank J. Sorauf, Extra-Legal Political Parties in Wisconsin, 48 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 692, 692
(1954) (“American political parties have long been the victims of a peculiarly ambivalent public attitude—an
attitude which on the one hand views them as perverters of the democratic spirit while on the other hand it gives
them a vital role in the democratic process.”).  
9 Morris Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections 202 (1981); see also Walter
Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics 133 (1971) (“The only way
collective responsibility has ever existed, and can exist given our institutions, is through the agency of the
political party.”).
10 Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of
Competing Paradigms, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 775, 786 (2000); see also Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in the
American Mold 158-74 (1986) (describing historical distrust of political parties).  
11
 Stephen E. Gottlieb, Election Reform and Democratic Objectives—Match or Mismatch, 9 Yale
L. & Pol’y Rev. 205, 215-16 (1991); see also Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Political Parties and American
Constitutionalism, in American Political Parties and Constitutional Politics 1, 1-12 (Peter W. Schramm &
Bradford P. Wilson eds., 1993) (discussing the tradition of American ambivalence toward political parties).  
They develop political strategy, bring together likeminded politicians, and coordinate
policymaking across different branches and levels of government.  All fifty sitting governors
are either Republicans or Democrats, and nearly every elected federal official is affiliated
with one of the major parties.7
Nonetheless, Americans have always harbored ambivalence about political parties.8
On one hand, parties mediate the potential chaos of mass politics and provide organization
for both politicians and voters.  Morris Fiorina declares that parties are the only means by
which to attribute “responsibility to government decision making.”9  On the other hand,
reformers fear excessive control by party insiders and worry that elections will become
“sham competitions while the true kingmakers decided the winner behind closed doors in
the prototypical smoke-filled room.”10  As Stephen Gottlieb explains, reformers “have
presupposed that the parties, when stronger, ignore their constituents, become far too self-
protective, avoid issues in pursuit of victory, and hide private manipulations that serve the
party professionals at the expense of the electorate.”11
HYDRAULICS AND POLITICS OF PARTY REGULATION 7
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 Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold 157 (1986). 
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 See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Primus Inter Pares: Political Parties and Civil Society, 75 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 493, 509 (2000); see also Daniel Hays Lowenstein & Richard L. Hasen, Election Law: Cases and
Materials 431 (2001) (explaining that “the history of American political parties has been to give voters more,
not less direct control over party candidates and positions”); John F. Bibby, State Party Organizations:
Coping and Adapting to Candidate-Centered Politics and Nationalization, in The Parties Respond: Changes
in American Parties and Campaigns 23, 25 (L. Sandy Maisel ed., 1998) (noting that “the net effect of state
laws has been to mold state parties into quasi-public agencies and to limit party leaders’ flexibility in
devising strategies to achieve organizational goals”); William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for
Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Nw. L. Rev. 335 (2000) (describing an “overwhelming trend in American
campaign reform . . . towards democratization”).  
15
 For example, if she wishes, a voter could vote in the Democratic primary for governor, then vote
in the Republican primary for Secretary of State, and so forth.
As a consequence, reformers regularly seek democratizing legislation that would
shift control of party affairs from party leaders to the voters.12  Leon Epstein likened parties
to public utilities in the sense that parties are agencies “performing a service in which the
public has a special interest sufficient to justify governmental regulatory control.”13 State
regulation attempts to influence the character and operation of political parties in a way that
helps produce a healthy democratic process.  The goal is to reinforce democratic interests
like political participation, an informed electorate, and most prominently, democratic
responsiveness and popular input into party business.14
A recent well-known example is the California blanket primary, enacted by popular
approval of Proposition 198 before being struck down by the Supreme Court in California
Democratic Party v. Jones.  Before Proposition 198, California conducted closed primaries
in which only registered members of a party could vote in that party’s primary.  Proposition
198 replaced closed primaries with a single blanket primary in which voters, regardless of
party registration, could vote in different party primary races for different offices all on a
single ballot.15  In short, Proposition 198 opened every party’s nomination process, on an
office-by-office basis, to anyone who wished to cast a vote.  
Proposition 198 represented a classic example of party regulation justified as an
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16 California Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp 1288, 1303 (E.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 169 F.3d 646
(9th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
17 See also O’Callaghan v. State of Alaska, 914 P.2d 1250, 1261-63 (Alaska 1996) (upholding the
Alaska blanket primary based on similar state interests). 
18
 However, in reaching its decision, the district court professed its agnosticism about “whether a
blanket primary is a good idea.” Jones, 984 F. Supp at 1303.  The court explained that the blanket primary might
prove itself a bad idea, and in such case “the people of the State presumably will act to reform the system in the
future as they have in the past.”  Id.
19 The particular regulatory focus on the Republicans and Democrats, the two major parties, stems from
their dominant institutional advantage within the American electoral system.  American elections overwhelmingly
employ a single-member district, first-past-the-post methodology under which the candidate who garners a
plurality of votes wins the election.  Duverger’s Law, a staple proposition of political science, avers that the
single-member district, first-past-the-post regime gravitates toward a two-party system.  The goal of achieving
a winning plurality encourages both voters and candidates to push one of the top two contestants to victory, rather
than try to help the third-place contestant leapfrog from third to first.  See William H. Riker, The Two-Party
System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science, 76 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 753 (1982)
(assessing Duverger’s Law and describing the related literature); Maurice Duverger, Political Parties 217 (1954)
(introducing Duverger’s Law).  The American system rewards a third party nothing for its effort when it collects
attempt to shape the character of politics for the better by democratizing the way that the
parties conduct their affairs.  Supporters framed the blanket primary as a reform measure to
increase competition and democratic responsiveness while reducing the influence of insiders
and special interest groups.  The district court in the litigation over Proposition 198
characterized the blanket primary as a legitimate “experiment in democratic government,”
continuing the pattern of “change and adaptation as the States have responded to the play
of different political forces and circumstances.”16  The court upheld the blanket primary
based squarely on the rightful discretion of state government to regulate and restrict political
parties in the pursuit of stronger, healthier democratic politics.17
The overarching rationale for party regulation, as it was for Proposition 198, is a
public spirited appeal to positive reform of the political process.  The premise is that the
parties are so pervasively involved in politics, and so influential, that regulating how parties
operate will, in turn, change the way that politics are conducted.  If the state requires the
parties to adopt more open procedures of candidate selection, then the democratic process
will become more open and democratic, almost by definition.18  The goal is to reform
politics by reforming the main political actors—the major parties.19
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 Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational
Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 274, 278 (2001).  
21 See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational
Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 274, 278-79 (2001) (arguing that “the development
of the major political parties as the central political actors of our electoral system is, in large part, a by-product
of the structures of the electoral system makes quite suspect claims of formal independence from state
oversight”).  
22
 Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational
Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 274, 276 (2001); see also Samuel Issacharoff,
Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 615 (2002). 
23
 Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1605, 1623 (1999); see
also Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno
to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1345, 1346 (2001). 
24 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643, 649 (1998) (“[W]e propose that a self-conscious judiciary should
destabilize political lockups in order to protect the competitive vitality of the electoral process and facilitate more
Reformers and legal scholars also contend that the parties cannot extend “a full-
throated demand for autonomy from state regulation” because such a claim would be
“compromised by the fact that the present party system is so fundamentally the product of
a heavily regulated electoral arena.”20  The parties, they claim, are necessarily a construct
of the electoral regime.21  If the necessary creation of an election system helps produce the
parties as they are, reform can be directed toward modifying the election system and further
regulating the parties for the better.  Reformers can use the law to democratize the parties
in ways that best serve public goals. 
As a result, the dominant trend among legal scholars commenting on election law
is away from traditional rights-based approaches, toward a “programmatic, functional
approach” to legal regulation.22  Under this approach, courts should regulate the institutional
arrangements of politics with a normative focus directed at what “best help[s] realize the
appropriate systemic aims of elections.”23  For instance, they ought to uphold state
regulation that helps reinforce partisan competition and therefore promotes responsive
representation.24  Conversely, courts should strike down regulation that entrenches the
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 Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1605, 1611 (1999).
26 See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First
Amendment, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1939 (2003); Richard L. Hasen, Do the Parties or the People Own the
Electoral Process?, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 815 (2001).
27 Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms,
and Partisan Competition, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 274, 279 (2001). 
28 Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First Amendment, 44
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1939 (2003).
favored position of the major parties and incumbents.  By regulating the structural
conditions of the democratic process, courts can ensure that “central democratic values, such
as responsiveness of policy to citizen values and effective citizen voice and participation,
are best realized in mass democracies.”25
Legal scholars thus disapproved when the Court struck down the blanket primary
in California Democratic Party v. Jones.26  They pointed out that California voters enacted
the blanket primary by direct democracy and forced the parties to open up their candidate
selection process.  The blanket primary was “a rebellion of the electorate against the claims
rights of the party institutional apparatus and the party-in-government [i.e., government
officials] to condition the terms under which the party presents itself to voters.”27  It was
consistent with the prominent reform goal of locating party decisionmaking with the party
voters, as opposed to the party leadership.
Legal scholars seek to develop legal theories of the political party that enlist the
party as a vehicle to promote structural ends.  Gregory Magarian advocates for a First
Amendment theory that would allow substantial regulation of the major parties and protect
minor parties with the goal of facilitating a participatory democracy, heightening
competition, and invigorating political debate.28  Surveying a broad swath of party-related
cases, Magarian concludes that the Court has been excessively solicitous of the major
parties’ rights and thus suppressed political vitality in American politics by insulating them
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 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643 (1998). 
30 Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 750
(2001).
31 Id. at 752.
from competition.  Likewise, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes argue that courts ought
to serve as watchdogs against the major parties and strike down moves to lock themselves
into power.29  Nathaniel Persily favors a functional theory of political parties that would
grant parties wider legal autonomy to encourage their functions as vehicles for competition
and representation.30
In sum, legal scholars and reformers generally agree that law is a useful and
effective means of reforming the political process for the better.  The prevailing wisdom,
as Persily concludes, is that courts “ought to be quite activist in striking down barriers to
competition between the two parties, but quite docile when it comes to scrutinizing state
laws that rein in the parties’ autonomy.”31  Legal scholars and reformers hope that reform
measures, such as the blanket primary, will increase the democratic responsiveness of the
parties by shifting influence away from the leadership and toward the electorate. 
III. A SUPRALEGAL THEORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES
A.  Parties Outside the Law
The problem with the foregoing understanding of political parties and their
regulation is that it mistakes parties to be discrete, identifiable entities that can be defined
by law.  The conventional view fails entirely to understand that parties are foremost
supralegal creatures that defy and transcend legal and regulatory definition. 
In functional practice, the heart of a political party is a set of shared political goals
that bring together a large constellation of actors and institutions in roughly common cause.
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32 See, e.g., Paul Allen Beck, Party Politics in America 66-69 (8th ed. 1997); John F. Bibby, State Party
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at 23, 24-25.
A political party is a common enterprise in which the constituents benefit from coordination
and intend to collaborate.  Politically motivated actors elect to cooperate with one another
in the service of overlapping interests, which may be ideological, personal, financial, or
otherwise.  A political party in a full sense is best understood as the collection of political
relationships that bind together this loose party alliance.   
The constellation of party actors extends far beyond the legal apparatus of the party.
Although parties are in one sense highly regulated, legally defined entities,32 the law
captures only a small portion of the activity and people referenced when we refer
colloquially to a “political party.”  Beyond a party’s nominees or titular officials (such as
the party chairman, spokespeople, and employees), the party comprises all types of actors
and institutions, many of which bear no formal relationship with the official party structure.
The supralegal party is a teeming, polyarchic aggregation of politically interested
constituents, not a tangible organization with a unitary personality and identity.  The
kaleidoscopic mass of political activists, volunteers, financial contributors, interest groups,
PACs, lawyers, consultants, journalists, and intellectuals who perform important work
aligned with the party’s collective agenda are not necessarily bound formally to or paid by
the official party. 
One of the principal goals of a party is to elect party nominees into government
office, but it is not the singular goal of a political party, nor even a defining goal of many
party constituents.  Many party actors may prioritize narrower policy aims, or conversely
a broader ideological crusade, that detracts from the goal of electing party nominees in the
next election.  Other party actors may support the party simply to advance financial or
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personal interests by influencing policymaking and winning access to government officials.
Even citizens who devote minimal resources to politics may understand and see themselves
as important practicing constituents of their party if they vote consistently for their party or
otherwise self-identify as party members.  A political party encompasses a wide variety of
party actors who bring with them a diversity of motivations and interests, but find it
worthwhile to work together, or at least in parallel, in furtherance of overlapping political
goals.   
In other words, a “political party” is foremost a useful shorthand for this type of
informal coalition, rather than a tangible organization or a collective membership group.33
When we make reference to political parties, we most often mean to refer to a larger concept
above and beyond a party’s nominees and official organization.  We mean the “party” to
signify more generally a larger, decentralized group of actors bound less by formal ties to
the party than by informal relationships that bring them together for common political goals.
The fact that these relationships are informal, and contributions often private or conducted
independently of the official party structure, does not make them any less politically
meaningful.  
In other words, the political party cannot be understood simply as a discrete,
identifiable entity.  The party may manifest itself in various legal forms, for instance a party
committee, a party convention, or in the person of a party candidate.  However, it is
impossible to say that any single legal entity, or collection of legal entities, sufficiently
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represents all the myriad constituents of a party.  The minimum of formalized relationships
binding together the mass of the party makes it difficult to regulate or define these party
actors through legal language.  At the party’s heart, there is simply nothing to regulate
except a large variegated group of roughly likeminded individuals who act at times in
concert and at times in conflict with one another. 
The legal organizational form of the party merely represents the legal face that
certain party actors choose to adopt when beneficial.  The party’s legal apparatus is
incidental to the broader fundamental activity of political leaders trying to achieve political
goals, whether through the party’s legal apparatus or outside it.  The legal apparatus is what
John Aldrich refers to as an “endogenous institution,” shaped by party actors as they see
fit.34  When circumstances change, as they do all the time, party actors simply re-shape the
organizational forms, rules, and strategies of their party in response to legal and political
demands as they arise.35  Legal regulation defines the political party in static legal language
that cannot keep pace with the ever-changing forms and practices of what we regard
substantively as a “political party.” 
To complicate matters further, just as it is difficult for the law to track the legal
apparatus of the party, it can be similarly difficult to identify the underlying political
dynamics driving the legal apparatus of the party. Complicating our understanding of
political parties is the fact that parties are characterized by internal diversity as well as a
limited degree of general cooperation.  This diversity among party constituents produces as
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much intraparty friction as intraparty cohesion.  While party actors may agree in certain
broad respects, they may disagree on many others and disagree on even many more
specifics.  As a result, individual party actors compete constantly to advance their particular
political agenda against other political actors with different agendas, within their own party
as well as in opposing parties.  The fraternal competition within a party among rival factions
is equally significant and often as fierce as interparty competition.36
Members of a party share some common goals, but parties are not ideologically or
politically monolithic.  A political party embodies an enduring alliance among leaders
possessed of overlapping preferences who see mutual benefit in sticking together on a wide
range of issues inside of, and even outside of, their overlapping consensus.  The party solves
collective action problems and induces stability by allowing leaders to agree in advance to
work together, even when their preferences diverge in a particular instance.  However, it is
important to realize that parties are defined by just enough, but not more, ideological
similarity among members such that an alliance is useful.37
Although the purpose of the party arrangement is to coordinate party members in
common cause, party leaders compete among themselves to push coordination of the party
toward positions that coincide with their respective preferences.  Leaders within the same
party disagree, often quite deeply, about issues large and small, and they compete internally
to direct their party toward their particular interests.  Intraparty competition mirrors
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interparty competition, as individual leaders try to impose regulations and procedures on
their own party that will favor their agenda over those of others.  In the following sections,
I explain how these different types of competition and coordination among party leaders
complicate our understanding of political parties.  
B.  The Overnarrow Party and the Hydraulics of Party Regulation
Parties defy legal definition in multiple directions.  In this section, I argue that it is
easy to define a political party in an overly narrow fashion that ignores vital segments and
dynamics of the party effort.  This mistake obscures what I call the “hydraulics of party
regulation.”  
1.    Hydraulics: The Theory
The major political parties have displayed remarkable capacity for adaptation to
changing political circumstances.  Throughout the twentieth century, parties have found new
ways to accomplish their goals when old ways of achieving those goals have been cut off.
Although reformers attempted periodically to affect the way that parties operate, political
parties each time recovered to re-assert control over their affairs.  Frank Sorauf once
explained that “with almost chameleon-like ability, parties adapt themselves to new external
regulation or internal pressure.”38  As a consequence, the parties of the 1960s and the parties
of today “have something in common, but the structures and functions of the organizations
are different.”39
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Parties have been adaptable to changing circumstances because there is a mismatch
between the “party” that reformers intend to regulate and the “party” to which legal
regulation attaches.  Regulation of political parties deploys legal language to target and
influence political activity.  Reformers can change the law where it intersects with party
activity, such as the rules affecting ballot access, holding primary elections, and other formal
affairs.  Regulation thus attaches to the legal apparatuses of the parties, where the parties
manifest themselves through legally defined entities.  
However, behind the party’s legal entities stands the larger, supralegal party
coalition—the true party that reformers intended to restrict.  The party comprises a loosely
connected network of political actors—some of whom are party officials and most of whom
are not, some of whom are professionals and many of whom are not—that performs
important work in furtherance of the party agenda.  Much of what is legally regarded as
official party activity can be instead accomplished informally outside the ambit of election
law by these unofficial actors and institutions who are allied with the party, but not legally
connected to the party’s legal apparatus.  
When the party’s legal apparatus is frustrated by party regulation, the party can shift
its efforts away from the official apparatus and divert its strategic activity into less public,
less regulated settings through these private channels available to it.  When reform restricts
what party leaders can accomplish via party business, they step back and try to accomplish
the same objectives through informal, private activity.  As a result, the effect of legal
regulations that restrict what party leaders can accomplish through the official party
structure is to push strategic behavior back a level, out of the party’s legal apparatus and
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further into the private unregulated realm.  The legal apparatus of the parties, however
important, are merely tools of political leadership whose legal forms can be abandoned
whenever they become unprofitable for party leaders. 
Drawing a connection across legal domains, the problem of avoidance here is
analogous to the familiar problem of tax avoidance in corporate law.  Because tax rules
typically impose liability based on the legal form of the transaction and entities involved,
instead of the economic substance, tax lawyers are often able to manipulate legal structures
to avoid taxation without changing the economics of the transaction.40  Changing the form
of the transaction or transacting entities does not necessarily affect the fundamental
economics—each party still can get what it wanted from the deal—but the transaction will
be structured in whatever way their tax burden is lowest.  The legal form bears no necessary
relationship to the substantive fundamentals of those transactions.41  As a result, regulation
articulated on the basis of legal forms may struggle to influence substantive economic
behavior, except certainly to encourage avoidant conduct.42  Just so, the realities of party
regulation face the same problem. 
Political leaders in most instances can engage in meaningful political activity
outside of the party structure.  It would be difficult for General Motors to avoid regulation
by shedding its corporate form and doing business by alternative means, but political leaders
suffer little trouble rallying elite support, building coalitions, organizing campaign efforts,
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or helping to raise funds without being officially affiliated with party affairs.  A classic
example is Frank Sorauf’s study of “extra-legal political parties” in Wisconsin.43  During
the first half of the twentieth century, Wisconsin law restricted the electioneering,
organizational structure, and campaign finance activity of the official party structures.
Major party leaders responded by abandoning the official party and working through
“voluntary committees” legally separate from the official party apparatus defined by statute.
As nominally private associations, the committees were not subject to Wisconsin’s
regulations on parties.  The statewide voluntary committee for each party became “in effect
the party,” which carried on the basic functions of raising funds, campaigning, and seeking
office.44  Leaders act through a political party because it offers a certain package of costs
and benefits.  When regulation significantly raises the cost of acting via the party structure,
leaders seek alternate means of doing business at lower cost.  
I argue that there exists a hydraulics of party regulation.45  Like water, the party
leadership seeks a return to its level of influence, finding gaps and openings in the
regulatory edifice whether they exist in the public or private domain.  The hydraulics of
party regulation signal that party leaders, when they are unified, may circumvent party
reform that tries to restrict what they want to accomplish.  When the law interferes with the
operation of a political party and prevents leaders from pursuing their interests through their
party, reform shifts leaders away from the party and directs their strategic behavior into less
public, less regulated directions. 
Legal constriction of what leaders can do officially through the party vehicle causes
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leaders to step back and devise new, more private, means for accomplishing the same.
Political leaders seek to influence and control politics under any regime.  The main effect
of regulation may be only to push political maneuvering by leaders out from under the party
auspices and into the less regulated private arena.  Consequently, the hydraulics of party
regulation often lead not to changed outcomes, but similar outcomes by different means,
perhaps outside the party aegis. 
Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan once described a ubiquitous dynamic of
campaign finance reform, which they termed the hydraulics of campaign finance.46
Attempts to limit campaign funding in one respect promptly re-directs money into new,
equally effective alternative channels.  Limiting contributions leads not to a reduction in
total campaign spending, but instead shifts funds from contributions to the unregulated
opportunities of independent expenditures.
However, Issacharoff and Karlan completely failed to recognize that the hydraulics
of campaign finance are most often just a subset category of the hydraulics of party
regulation.  Restrictions on party-related campaign finance induces leaders and financiers
to conduct their financial transactions through independent expenditures nominally separate
from the party legal structure.  Legal obstacles encourage political leaders to find new, more
effective private means of effectuating the results that they achieved previously through
their party.  The real hydraulics problem is more profound and rises above the fungibility
of money or the particulars of campaign finance.  
The same skepticism that now surrounds campaign finance reform ought to be
applied to party regulation.  In light of the hydraulics of campaign finance reform, even
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reform-minded legal scholars have resigned themselves to pessimism about the potential of
regulatory reform to insulate politics from money.  Some sympathetic scholars have
surrendered the notion of campaign finance restrictions in favor of disclosure oriented
approaches that attempt to channel money rather than limit its flow.  However, this
skepticism about reform has not yet extended to the notion of party regulation more
generally.  
Just as for campaign finance reform, effective reform may be possible through party
regulation, but it is likewise difficult and problematic.  Reform attempts may be frustrated
and lead ultimately to unanticipated results contrary to the original reformist goals.  For a
chance at success, party regulation would require continuing intrusions further and further
into the private realm to chase down party-relevant behavior, as political leaders recede from
the public arena to escape regulation.  And unlike many other regulatory settings, expansion
of regulation to cover private political activity raises First Amendment considerations that
may limit how successfully regulation can adapt.  
2.   Hydraulics in Action
A prominent example of how party reform can be subverted by clever leadership is
the McGovern-Fraser reforms.  Before McGovern-Fraser, both major parties chose their
presidential nominee basically by convention.  Local party leaders selected and controlled
convention delegates, and selection of a presidential nominee occurred only after negotiation
and bargaining by party bosses—mythic smoke-filled backroom dealmaking.47  Before
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McGovern-Fraser, “parties as institutions—that is, state party organizations and major
governmental officeholders elected under the party label—had a major, even decisive, role
in determining who would receive the party’s nomination for president.”48
The McGovern-Fraser reforms represented “an explicit rejection of the claim that
nominations are the business of party leaders.”49  The Democratic Party’s Commission on
Party Structure and Delegate Selection, chaired by George McGovern and Donald Fraser,
and better known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission, recommended a number of
alterations to presidential nomination process.  Their ultimate effect was a shift in both
major parties from leader-dominated conventions for selecting presidential nominees, to
direct primary elections, with the explicit goal of opening nominations to the party
membership.50  As Richard Hasen summarizes, McGovern-Fraser “moved power to choose
the major parties’ nominees from the hands of local bosses into the hands of the party-
affiliated voters, the party-in-the-electorate.”51  Since McGovern-Fraser, the presidential
candidate for each party has won the nomination by winning primary contests state-by-state.
Stripping direct control of nominations from the party leaders was much criticized
and lamented by commentators.  Austin Ranney protested that, after McGovern-Fraser,
“[t]he party organizations simply are not actors in presidential politics.  Indeed, they are
little more than custodians of the party-label prize which goes to the winning candidate
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organization.”52  Similarly, Michael Hagen and William Mayer concluded that in the new
system, “[t]he party organization and the party in government were almost entirely stripped
of any significant voice in the decision.”53  They feared that McGovern-Fraser bypassed the
party leadership and turned the nomination process over wholesale to an uninformed, easily
misled electorate. 
Legal scholars for too long have commented on the supposed decline of parties in
the aftermath of McGovern-Fraser and likeminded reforms.  They remain unaware of how
political scientists in current research widely proclaim a renaissance of political party
strength.  Party loyalty in Congress and in the electorate appears to exercise a stronger
influence on voting than ever before measured.  Despite all the early concerns about
McGovern-Fraser, party leaders have responded to the reform challenge and quietly re-
established control over presidential nominations.  
Although McGovern-Fraser stripped party leaders of their formal authority to
appoint the nominees directly, party leaders have developed an indirect and informal means
of influencing who wins the primaries.  Party leaders now run an “Invisible Primary” among
themselves, before the actual primaries take place,54  During the Invisible Primary, party
leaders signal each other through a sequence of pre-primary endorsements and informally
coordinate among themselves.  A relatively small identifiable group of political insiders—“a
stable pool of elites that exists independent of any candidate organization”55—announce
endorsements early in the election cycle, always before the first primaries, and eventually
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determine a favorite.  
Once a favorite emerges, party leaders channel decisive resources and support to the
favored nominee for the upcoming primary elections.  This frontrunner absorbs the majority
support of a relatively small pool of “central fundraisers” and regular contributors who
reliably back the insiders’ favorite.56  As one political reporter describes the Invisible
Primary, “In this campaign before the campaign, the index is not a ballot count but money
raised, would-be staffers secured, and speeches delivered in places such as Iowa and New
Hampshire, which formally launch the nomination process 18 months from now.”57 John
Zaller and his colleagues found that the candidate who emerged with a clear lead in pre-
primary endorsements from party leaders later became the party’s nominee in eight of nine
contested nominations since 1980.58  In short, during the Invisible Primary, the candidates
compete before the primaries for the support of party leaders who control the decisive
campaign financing and services necessary beforehand to win the primary elections. 
Candidates without the backing of party leadership struggle to compete because they
lack the resources for the intense primary campaign.  Despite Pat Buchanan’s early success
in 1996, winning the Louisiana and New Hampshire Republican primaries, his candidacy
never threatened to claim the nomination because he was without the money, organization,
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and support from Republican insiders.59  Similarly, in 2000, Republican maverick John
McCain encountered a similar “firewall” of opposition after early success in the Republican
primaries.  According to opinion polls, McCain was the general public’s most popular
candidate, the Republican with the best chance of winning the general election.60  However,
Republican leaders rallied almost unanimously behind Invisible Primary winner George W.
Bush, lifting Bush to victory over McCain.61  The 2004 Democratic primaries presented a
more complicated picture, but with similar end results.  Howard Dean led in the polls
leading up to the primary elections, despite having limited support from the party leadership,
but the party quickly closed ranks behind initial favorite John Kerry.  Dean won only one
primary, in his home state of Vermont, only after he withdrew from the race.  
Many commentators have characterized this new means of politics as “candidate-
centered,” as opposed to the “party-centered” politics of the convention era, but the same
actors are working to achieve similar goals as before.  Party leaders regrouped from the loss
of direct control of nominations through official party conventions and found a new, less
formal way of influencing outcomes.  Political actors within the party now act outside of
official party caucuses, conventions, and organizations, and now work directly for particular
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candidates, campaigns, and specific causes.  McGovern-Fraser certainly changed the means
by which these party actors exercise influence, and thereby shifted power among them, but
it did not effectuate a major shift in power from these party leaders as a class to the
electorate in the way that reformers hoped and critics feared.62
The effect of McGovern-Fraser was to push back strategic action by leaders into a
more private realm in which party leaders act not officially as party representatives
bargaining at a convention, but as interdependent activists each trying to influence the
party’s ultimate selection of a nominee.  Interest groups, financial contributors, and party
politicians have always successfully advanced their favored candidates and influenced
nominations, before McGovern-Fraser and since.  
3.    Hydraulics and the Limitations of Party Regulation
The lesson for courts and reformers is that legal regulation will be unlikely to
dampen the collective influence of a unified party leadership.  When regulation increases
the control that party leaders as a group will be able to exercise, leaders will happily accede
to the boost in their influence over party affairs.  When regulation aims to reduce the control
of party leaders, party leaders will quickly switch from old methods to new ones.  The
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hydraulics of party regulation tend to re-direct collective leadership influence from one form
to another, rather than reduce it in the aggregate.  
The political relationships binding together party leaders are informal, not legal, and
they continue to work together even when the law restricts the official party.  Institutional
reforms may not lead to the desired results because they leave unchanged the fundamental
interests that leaders possess to strategize within the new institutional framework and skew
outcomes in their favor.  Indeed, the very popularity of, and perceived need for, the blanket
primary in Proposition 198 reflected frustration with the failure of the McGovern-Fraser
Commission’s recommendations to open the party’s nomination procedures. 
Just as re-direction of campaign financing from one form into another can be
salutary,63 party regulation that pushes political activity in different directions also can be
beneficial.  Reform forces leaders to adjust time-tested strategies and adapt to new
institutional settings.  Party regulation may make it more difficult to accomplish certain
ends, or tip the balance between competing factions.  Reform can force leaders to shift from
the most cost-effective methods, at least by some accounting, to a new equilibrium.  By so
doing, party regulation might in certain instances serve expressive goals or empower
particular groups and leaders rather than others, consistent with normative ends.  My goal
for now is simply to introduce a realistic skepticism about the potential of party regulation,
and court decisions regarding party regulation, to generate the anticipated benefits that
reformers and legal scholars covet.  
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Structural approaches to election law overstate how well party regulation can
condition strategic behavior by political leaders.  Whatever benefits that flow from party
regulation, if they result at all after the hydraulics process unfolds, are likely to be less
significant than optimists expect.  Moreover, the effects of regulation will be unpredictable
ex ante, given the dynamism of the hydraulics process.  Regulation can force changes in the
way that politics are conducted, but the degree to which reform “works” depends more on
the ingenuity of the political leaders targeted by reform than the legal design of reform.
Leaders of the major parties are smart, motivated, and resourceful enough to minimize the
effects of stringent regulation and find new ways to perform old tricks.  Legal scholarship
that seeks to justify party regulation and advocate structural approaches to election law must
carefully take into account the hydraulics phenomenon and argue its case in context-specific
terms, rather than assume that party regulation leads cleanly to its intended results. 
If nothing else, the major changes in the practices of the political parties in the wake
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) demonstrates how political actors can
quickly adapt to, and flourish in spite of, substantial reform efforts.  The immediate response
to BCRA, particularly from the Democratic Party, was to build a “shadow party” of private
527 and 501(c) organizations.64  These organizations were created, funded, and often led by
individuals previously associated with the official party, and this shadow party undertook
an impressive array of basic operations previously assumed by the official party structure.
These groups raised money, ran advertisements, organized volunteer networks, and
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registered voters just as the official party might have, before BCRA.  Nonetheless, the
shadow party stood legally independent of the official party for the purpose of avoiding
BCRA.  What is more, the official parties managed to raise more in hard money than ever
and gathered record amounts in total fundraising, despite the new restrictions imposed by
BCRA.65
Finally, party regulation entails important costs that have been heretofore neglected,
the most important of which may be transparency.  During the hydraulics process, strategic
behavior is pushed deeper into the quiet background of politics where it become more
difficult for the public to monitor how important political questions are resolved.  As
leadership maneuvering retreats from the public domain to the private, accountability and
public awareness decrease even further.  And as regulation expands to cover this type of
private political activity, the shadow of the First Amendment stands a backstop.  While some
scholars argue that the First Amendment ought to be relaxed to allow stricter regulation in
the context of campaigns and elections, free expression concerns still must be weighed
against the expected benefits.  Pushing back the boundary between private and regulable
activity in this context entails potential costs, as regulation encroaches further into the
private domain.
The Supreme Court, in McConnell v. FEC, expressed awareness of the challenge
presented by regulatory avoidance but exhibited less sensitivity about its intractability.66
The Court repeatedly upheld provisions of BCRA under the interest of forestalling
circumvention of other campaign finance restrictions.  However, the Court may need to
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reach quite far to reach avoidant behavior, because the party actors are willing and able to
retreat as far as necessary into the private domain, daring open regulation of campaign
speech proximate to an election.  The post-BCRA experience demonstrates the malleability
of party operations, as party actors adapted not only their fundraising apparatus to new law,
but wholly re-organized the way that they conducted the entire range of their political
activity in furtherance of the party effort.  
The national party committees against whom BCRA was aimed have flourished
despite the new restrictions, while less wealthy, less sophisticated political actors are
comparatively disadvantaged by the increased costs of regulatory compliance.67  The
national party committees, helped by higher contribution limits, raised unprecedented
amounts of federal money to compensate for the loss of soft money contributions under
BCRA.  Although the costs of compliance with federal and state campaign finance laws
increases with regulatory complexity and scope, the national committees and similarly well-
financed organizations absorb the new costs with relative ease.  Groups with fewer
resources—for instance, minor parties, independent candidates, and unaffiliated advocacy
groups—are less able to afford the new costs of disclosure, monitoring, legal advice, and
strategy that flow from BCRA and continuing regulatory developments.  As regulation
expands further, the net effect is to push the political discourse further into the hands of a
relative few with the necessary expertise and finances to participate.  
C.    The Overbroad Party: Competition Within and Across Party Lines
Just as it is easy to conceptualize political parties too narrowly, it is equally
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problematic to conceptualize parties too broadly.  When we see parties as broad monolithic
coalitions of like-minded activists, we miss the diversity and intraparty competition inherent
in major party politics.  Indeed, intraparty competition itself is frequently the source of party
regulation.  Moreover, despite the hydraulics phenomenon, party regulation has important
effects on party activity because party leaders not only fail to stand unified against it, but
often advocate for it.  In this section, I explain those “politics of party regulation.”   
Party regulation is enacted when one set of party leaders codifies into state law its
preferred institutional arrangements, and litigation over party regulation arises when rival
party leaders respond by challenging it in court.  The hydraulics of party regulation reveal
reform for what it often is—politically motivated modification of the legal landscape to the
advantage of certain party actors and to the disadvantage of others. 
In this section, I introduce a trio of Supreme Court cases addressing state regulation
of party primaries.  I explain the politics of party regulation underlying each case and show
how conflict among party actors motivated the enactment of regulation and the ensuing
litigation over it.  Although the hydraulics of party regulation demonstrate the danger in
underestimating the breadth and cohesion of political parties, this section argues that
overestimating party unity entails the risk of missing the politics underlying party-related
litigation.   
1.    The Politics of Party Regulation: The Theory
The hydraulics of party regulation suggest that regulation typically fails to reduce
the influence of party leaders as a group, but nonetheless, it regularly succeeds in shifting
relative influence from one group of party leaders to another.  In fact, while regulation may
be framed as an attempt to achieve the former, the latter is more usually what regulation was
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intended to do.  Against rivals in their own party and against partisan opponents, leaders try
to use legal regulation to grant advantages to those with their comparative strengths and
impose disadvantages on others.  Each individual leader and her closest allies strive to create
a regulatory environment that benefits them and injures their opponents. 
For instance, although Proposition 198 was presented as party regulation designed
to open up the party’s decisionmaking and democratize the political process, its passage was
possible only because of the wherewithal of one particular party leadership faction, Rep.
Tom Campbell and his supporters.  Advocates of a blanket primary in California tried and
failed earlier to collect enough signatures to get an initiative on the ballot.  However,
Campbell’s defeat to conservative Bruce Herschensohn in a Republican Senate primary
motivated Campbell and his well-funded supporters to place the blanket primary on the
ballot and win its passage in a 1996 referendum.
The Campbell faction calculated that a blanket primary, with its moderating effect
on the primary contest, would optimize his chances, as a centrist, to survive the Republican
primary for Senate and reach the general election.68  Moreover, Campbell and his supporters
realized that while many leaders of both major parties would oppose a blanket primary,
voters might support a blanket primary in a statewide vote.  They successfully used the
initiative process where they were likely to win and bypassed the legislative arena where
they were likely to lose.  Campbell explained frankly that Proposition 198 gave him “the
best chance [he’s] got to win a primary.”69
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Although legal scholars characterize Proposition 198 as a victory of the party
electorate over the party leadership, Proposition 198 was actually a fight between competing
Republican leadership groups.  Issacharoff characterizes Proposition 198 as “the revenge
of the median voter (or the party-in-the-electorate) upon the party-in-government and the
party apparatus.”70  Similarly, Pildes claimed that “it was the voters who imposed this
primary system over the objection of the political parties.”71  However, it was not the case
that the party constituency decided for itself to rise up and enact what it wanted by direct
democracy. 
Without the strategic calculations of Campbell’s supporters, the blanket primary
would not have been born, regardless of the electorate’s preferences.  The benefit to centrist
voters from the blanket primary was a byproduct of the main goal of benefitting centrist
candidates advantaged by crossover voting in primary elections.72  Indeed, the other major
party leaders who filed briefs in support of the blanket primary, once Proposition 198
reached the Supreme Court, were centrist groups like the Hispanic Republican Caucus and
centrist politicians like Governor Gray Davis and Senators John McCain and William Brock
who shared similar political interests as Tom Campbell.73  True, Campbell’s maneuvers were
HYDRAULICS AND POLITICS OF PARTY REGULATION 34
74 See Bruce E. Cain, Party Autonomy and Two-Party Electoral Competition, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 793,
800 (2001) (characterizing Proposition 198 as “an attempt by one faction of the Republican Party to use state
law to gain advantage over another faction”).
75 See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry,
71 Tex. L. Rev. 1741, 1757 (1993) (“[U]nlike any other private groups, political parties routinely, pervasively,
and legitimately exercise their influence from within the government.”); Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional
Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 750, 752 (2001) (“‘The state’ is rarely, if ever, a neutral,
nonpartisan lawgiver that enacts unbiased rules of party membership.”); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of
Political Competition, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1605, 1610 (1999); (“States with one dominant party have often adopted
rules . . . that in purpose and effect enshrine or accentuate that party’s dominance.”).
76
  See Nancy Vogel, Looking to Design a Fairer Map, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 2005; Peter Nicholas, GOP
Fears a Redistricting Backfire, L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 2005
a minor victory for the electorate in the sense that its preferences were temporarily ratified.
However, the voters had a say only because its preferences coincided with Campbell’s and
only at the precise moment when it served his strategic interests.74  This sort of thin victory,
at Campbell’s behest and command, illustrates how activating the party electorate through
direct democracy may serve as only a contingent and provisional means to a strategic end,
rather than a meaningful commitment to an open process.  
Leaders have access to the levers of state government, and they wield them to gain
advantage over rival leaders.  As many commentators have noted, that the “state” in party
regulation cases is not an independent decisionmaker acting upon the party.75  The “state”
in these cases is merely one party element, and the “party” is merely another element among
several within the same party or another party with different interests.  One political faction
exploits the political and legal attractiveness of reform to seize political advantage for itself.
When Tom Campbell advocated for Proposition 198, he used the language of reform,
participation, and responsiveness.  He may have sincerely believed his reform rhetoric, but
he did not advocate regulatory change until he calculated a political benefit.  Similarly,
current California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger is campaigning for legislation or a
ballot initiative to entrust legislative redistricting to a nonpartisan commission.76
Schwarzenegger may believe that the commission is a solution for problems with partisan
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gerrymandering, but his principal hope is that the commission will produce a more centrist
legislature more amenable to his centrist agenda.  Rarely will political leaders fight
politically and legally for reforms that would injure them politically, relative to their rivals.
Armed with an understanding of the politics of party regulation, courts should
recognize that party regulation usually coincides with an attempt by one leadership group
to gain advantage over others, inside or outside the party, regardless of any public
justification.  What is really transpiring when party regulation lands in court is a dispute
among competing leadership groups, whether inside a party or across party lines.  One group
successfully exercised an advantage in state lawmaking to codify an institutional regime that
benefits it, over the countervailing efforts of other groups to defeat it.  If courts are to
address party regulation with reference to its potential structural effects, they must attend
closely to the outcomes that these politically motivated engineers of party regulation expect,
hope, and fear these regulatory adjustments will produce.  The litigants’ political
motivations are relevant because no one knows better than them what the structural effects
of party regulation are likely to be. 
It is not difficult for each litigant in a party regulation case to conjure up a colorable
claim that its position is the normatively or structurally correct one, just as every litigant in
Jones was able to do.  Political actors wield virtually every aspect of election law as
weapons against one another—campaign finance law, Shaw v. Reno, ethics inquiries, ballot
access regulation, the Voting Rights Act, direct democracy, legislative redistricting, and
most prominently here, party regulation.  In every case, each side musters fair sounding
justifications for the regulatory regime that favors it.77  The political party serves multiple
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purposes for many different actors in numerous different contexts such that many competing
actors can simultaneously stake legitimate claim to represent the party’s best interests in
some capacity.78  Litigants are talking about the First Amendment and democracy, but they
are fighting over which side will win the regulatory regime that better serves its interests.
This is not to say that reform goals can never be advanced through party regulation
and that all party regulation amounts to nothing more than political manipulation.  However,
the legal and democratic principles at stake tend, in light of the politics of party regulation,
to be overblown in these cases and the political dynamics tend to be overlooked.  Competing
party factions present their conflicting claims to the court, which is expected to decide party
cases on the basis of reform principles that are not driving the dispute. 
2.   The Politics of Party Regulation:  The Party Primary Cases as an Example
In this section, I demonstrate how intraparty conflict plays out in party-related cases
before the Supreme Court.  I address three Supreme Court cases addressing the most
prominent formof party regulation: state-imposed rules governing primary elections of party
candidates for public office—what the Court regards as the“basic function” of political
parties.79  I focus on Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette;80 California
Democratic Party v. Jones;81 and Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut.82
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 Rather than comply outright, the state party avoided obvious conflict with the national party rules
by selecting party delegates by closed caucus.  However, state law still bound the delegates to vote in accordance
with the results of the open primary.  See Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette v. Democratic Party of the United States,
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a. Description of the Cases
In Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,83 the Court addressed whether
state law overrides the national party’s internal rules and forces the national party to
recognize state delegates selected in violation of national party procedure.  The national
Democratic party rules required that state party organizations choose their delegates to the
national party convention by selection procedures that restricted participation exclusively
to Democratic party members, such as a closed primary or caucus.84  In other words, the
national party demanded that its state party subunits conduct candidate selection by means
of a closed process that excluded non-Democrats. 
However, Wisconsin law contradicted national party rules and required party
primaries to be open, permitting nonmembers to vote in the Democratic presidential
primary.85  What is more, the state of Wisconsin proudly boasted a longstanding Progressive
tradition of open primaries that the state Democratic party of Wisconsin was loath to
abandon.  Although Wisconsin Democrats controlled state government, they refused to
amend state law and continued to decide party nominations by open primary.86  After nearly
a decade of stubborn resistance, the state of Wisconsin sought injunctive relief against the
national party.  After Wisconsin state courts upheld the open primary law, the national party
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appealed to the United States Supreme Court.  
In La Follette, the Court reversed and held that the national party’s First
Amendment rights protected the freedom to exclude nonmembers from the party primary.
The Court sided squarely with the national party, explaining that freedom of association
“necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute the association,
and to limit the association to those people only.”87  By requiring that delegates be selected
by a closed primary, the national party simply exercised its right not to associate with
nonmembers of the party, at least for purposes of candidate nominations.  The Court
explained that “inclusion of persons unaffiliated with a political party may seriously distort
its collective decisions—thus impairing the party’s essential functions—and that political
parties may accordingly protect themselves.”88
For this reason, the state of Wisconsin could not force the unwilling national party
to seat delegates who were bound by state law to vote in accordance with the open primary
results.  The national party was not obligated to accept the open primary and was free to
insist upon closed procedures consistent with national party policy.  La Follette thus
established the party members’ associational rights to exclude nonmembers from the core
party activity of candidate selection, even with state law to the contrary.    
The Court revisited the conflict between state law and party rights in California
Democratic Party v. Jones.89  The Court addressed California’s blanket primary, which as
discussed above, was approved as a ballot initiative by 60 percent of the electorate.
However, most leaders in both major parties opposed the blanket primary.  The chairmen
of the California Republican and Democratic parties listed themselves in the official ballot
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pamphlet as opponents of Proposition 198’s passage.90  They contended that Democrats
choosing the Republican nominee, or vice versa, was like “letting UCLA’s football team
choose USC’s head coach.”  After Proposition 198 won enactment, the major parties filed
suit to enjoin the blanket primary, claiming that the forced inclusion of nonmembers in their
party primaries violated their associational rights.  
Faithful to La Follette, the Court in Jones again upheld the party’s right to exclude
nonmembers from its primary and be free from state interference.  For purposes of the
associational rights analysis, the blanket primary differed little from an open primary in La
Follette because it likewise “forces political parties to associate with—to have their
nominees, and hence their positions, determined by—those who, at best, have refused to
affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival.”91 A blanket
primary threatens to saddle the party with “an unwanted, and possibly antithetical”
candidate who could severely transform, or even destroy, the party’s message and mission.92
Together, La Follette and Jones appeared to reject state imposed participation of
nonmembers in party primaries when the party wishes to keep its primaries closed to
outsiders.  
La Follette and Jones bracket a third party primary case—Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Connecticut.93  In La Follette and Jones, political parties opposed state attempts to
open their primaries to nonmembers.  By contrast, the Connecticut Republican Party in
Tashjian wanted to open its primaries to nonmembers in derogation of a state law requiring
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their primaries to be closed.  Connecticut law at the time required both major parties to limit
the franchise for their primary elections to registered party members.94
Indeed, although the Court took little notice of the fact, Connecticut law gave party
leaders tighter control over nomination procedures than any other state.  State law entrusted
nominations to state party conventions, organized and attended by party officials from local
and state committees.  This closed process frequently obviated any need to hold a primary
election for most offices.95  One pair of scholars explained as a consequence that
“Connecticut can stake legitimate claim to being the ‘political parties state.’”96  Connecticut
was the last state to adopt a direct primary, and its restrictive nomination procedures
reflected, according to one observer, “the unwillingness of party professionals to open the
nominating process to the rank and file party members.”97
However, in 1983, the Connecticut Republican party began to consider opening its
primary to independent voters.  Frustrated with Democratic control of the state legislature
and almost every statewide office, the Connecticut G.O.P. amended its rules to permit
independent voters to vote in the primary.  Republicans in state government tried likewise
to amend Connecticut law to allow parties to open their primaries,98 but the Democrats in
state government thwarted any changes.  Flummoxed, the Republicans brought suit to
challenge the state prohibition on opening their primary to independents. Tashjian thus
presented the opposite situation from La Follette and Jones—here the party wanted to open
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its primary, and state law required the primary to be closed.  
In Tashjian, the Court decided in favor of the Republicans and declared
unconstitutional the state law barring an open primary.  As in La Follette and Jones, the
Court held that a state law regarding whom the party includes in its primary franchise
impermissibly intruded on the party’s associational rights.  However, in allowing a party to
open itself to outsiders, Tashjian’s description of the party’s associational rights shifted
importantly from La Follette and Jones.  
Remember that La Follette and Jones emphasized the party membership’s right to
protect itself from the distorting influence of nonmembers who do not share the party’s
philosophical commitments.  Faithful to this interest, the state of Connecticut justified its
closed-primary law as “the ideological guarantor of the Republican Party’s candidates.”99
The state claimed that the closed-primary requirement forced the party to protect its
ideological commitments from exactly the distorting influence feared by the Court in La
Follette and Jones.  
Nonetheless, the Court in Tashjian held that the party was entitled, if it so wished,
to invite nonmembers into its affairs and assume precisely this risk of a distorting influence
by nonmembers.  Any limitation on the group of registered voters whom the party may
invite to participate in selecting candidates also “limits the Party’s associational
opportunities at the critical juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be
translated into concerted action.”100  Thus, the Court arguably interpreted the same
associational rights as in La Follette and Jones to reach an opposite result.  In La Follette
and Jones, the Court based its associational rights analysis on the right of the party members
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Conversely, membership support for a closed primary was weakest in La Follette, a case in which the
Court effectively mandated it.  Wisconsin boasted a storied and popular tradition of open primaries that the state
party strove to preserve, in contravention of the national party’s policy.  Surveys conducted in 1980, as the La
Follette litigation began, reported that an overwhelming majority of Wisconsin residents opposed closing the
presidential primary.  One Milwaukee Sentinel survey, for example, found that voters favored retention of the
open primary by a margin of 90 to 6 percent.  See Gary D. Wekkin, Democrat Versus Democrat: The National
Party’s Campaign to Close the Wisconsin Primary 52-53 (1984).  The Wisconsin press mirrored the public’s
hostility to a closed primary.  Wisconsin newspapers published more editorials opposed to the closed primary
than in favor by a twelve-to-one margin.  Id. at 56-58.
In Tashjian, the picture of the party membership’s preferences is less clear, but it is unlikely that the
party voters favored inclusion of independents in the primary.  The G.O.P. break from the Connecticut tradition
of tight party control was the brainchild of Senator Lowell Weicker, a maverick unpopular among the Republican
leadership but popular among independent and Democratic voters.  Gary Rose, a scholar of Connecticut politics,
notes that Weicker orchestrated the movement to open Republican primaries to independents and observes that
“most Republicans at the time were not very enthusiastic about the prospect of Independents voting in their
primaries.”  E-mail from Gary L. Rose, Professor of Political Science, Sacred Heart University, to the author
(Mar. 11, 2003).  As Justice Scalia’s dissent recognized, in the end, the decision to open the Republican primary
to protect their ideological integrity from the diluting input of outsiders.  In Tashjian, the
Court upheld the party members’ right to include outsiders in participation in the primary,
even if those outsiders dilute the party.  
The end result of the party primary cases is what has been called a doctrinal regime
of “party autonomy”101 in which the party is free to open or close the primary as it wishes.
The Court established a party’s right “to be independent of state intrusion” in this
decision.102
b. Understanding the Party Primary Cases as Intraparty Competition
It is important to realize that party autonomy is complicated in the party primary
cases because in all three cases, substantial elements of the relevant party stood on opposite
sides of the question in the case.103  Competition within the party for control of the party’s
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direction was central to understanding the politics underlying the cases and how the Court’s
decisions helped resolve the political disputes at the heart of each case.  
The complication in the party primary cases, and virtually all litigation involving
political parties, is that it is far from clear who deserves claim to the party leadership.  A
supralegal theory of political parties understands parties as manifold entities that comprise
different factions of leaders with overlapping but distinguishable, and sometimes
conflicting, interests.  It is not obvious which party faction, among several that disagree,
ought to be deemed the legitimate party leadership regarding a particular question.    The
party primary cases revolve around the extension of this ordinary political rivalry to attempts
to trump opposing factions by use of state and constitutional law.   The party primary cases,
like almost all party-related cases, demand serious consideration of the underlying politics
that brought the litigants to court, particularly if the decision in the case is to depend on the
structural result of a decision either way.
These cases, almost by definition, featured one partisan group’s successful use of
state law either to impose regulatory change or thwart it, followed by another group’s legal
challenge bringing the political dispute to court.  In La Follette, the national Democratic
party pressured the state Democratic party to close Wisconsin’s open primary.  The state
party fiercely resisted any change for years and used the Wisconsin state law as a barrier
blocking the national party’s demand.104  Likewise, as discussed above, Jones arose out of
intraparty rivalry, this time inside the California Republican party.  Tom Campbell’s group
HYDRAULICS AND POLITICS OF PARTY REGULATION 44
105 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 224 (1986); Guy Charles describes
Tashjian as a case in which “the state sought to determine political outcomes, as opposed to allowing the political
market to dictate political outcomes.”  Guy-Uriel Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First
Amendment Right of Association, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1209 , 1254 (2003).
bypassed fellow Republicans in state government and enacted the blanket primary over their
heads via direct democracy.  Republican leaders, in turn, challenged the blanket primary in
court.  Political rivalry spilled over into the invocation of state law and then finally to
constitutional litigation in the federal courts.  
Tashjian likewise involved political rivalry, but it is distinct from La Follette and
Jones because it addressed what was primarily an interparty dispute between Republicans
and Democrats, rather than an internal dispute within either party.  Unlike La Follette and
Jones, there were not leaders from the same party filing briefs on both sides of the case.  At
the time of litigation, Connecticut Republicans stood united in their demand for an open
primary.  The Court recognized that the “state” in Tashjian was for all purposes simply the
Connecticut Democrats, “one political party transiently enjoying majority power,” who
purposely frustrated their Republican opponents’ attempts to modify the G.O.P. primary.105
The Court, applying the doctrine of party autonomy, intervened to prevent an obviously
partisan misuse of state power by Democrats in the pursuit of interparty advantage.  
Thus, the critical difference among the three cases was the degree to which the
relevant party leadership was divided or unified regarding whether to open or close the
primary.  When the party leadership was unified in Tashjian, the Court’s decision gave the
party what it wanted.  However, in La Follette and Jones, a single political party’s leadership
was itself fiercely divided into two opposed camps, one favoring open primaries and the
other favoring closed ones.  Of course, it would be constitutionally permissible for a unified
party as a whole to open the primary when acting under consensus, as the Connecticut
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Republicans did in Tashjian, despite whatever threat to the party’s ideological integrity.
Moreover, the problem in La Follette and Jones was not that the membership disagreed with
the leadership on whether to open the party’s primaries.  The Court defied the membership’s
preferences in each case.106  Instead, the problem in La Follette and Jones was that a single
party’s leadership was strongly divided on whether the party should hold open primaries.
Understanding parties as supralegal, diverse, and polyarchic creatures is fundamental to
recognizing the crux of the dispute as the vicious conflict within the party’s own leadership.
The conventional approach to parties often overlooks intraparty conflict like that
in La Follette and Jones.  A supralegal analysis of intraparty conflict clashes with the
traditional framework of the political party routinely relied upon by legal
commentators107—V.O. Key’s famous tripartite disaggregation of the party.108  First, the
“party-in-government” describes party politicians in government office who carry the party
label.  Second, the “party organization” describes the professional party activists who
perform the party-building, fundraising, and campaigning functions in service of party
candidates.  Third, the “party-in-the-electorate” describes voters who identify with a party
and whose votes (and opinions) are guided by the party label.  The first two groups together
constitute the “party leadership,” the political professionals who operate the party’s affairs,
as distinguished from the rank-and-file “party membership” of the party-in-the-electorate.
The legal commentary, when it considers the issue, typically frames the intraparty struggle
for party control as occurring between this party leadership against the party membership.
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This framework makes it difficult to recognize that intraparty competition occurs
in a relevant way only within and among the party leadership. Political leaders within the
party plot the important political moves and strategies that characterize the party primary
cases.  It is political leaders, like Tom Campbell in Jones or the Wisconsin Democratic
leadership in La Follette, who calculate the best ways to use state law to entrench their
preferred institutional arrangements.  They have both the means and incentives to use state
law to their advantage.  The party-in-the-electorate is simply not an affirmative actor in
intraparty disputes.  It plays a role only insofar as a political leader finds it to her advantage
to bring its influence into play.  Certainly, party leaders are sensitive to voter preferences.
But, as E.E. Schattschneider explained, the people are a sovereign that “can speak only
when spoken to,” and “whose vocabulary is limited to two words, ‘Yes’ and ‘No.’”109
Leaders make these important choices that structure the individual choices of individual
citizens.  In the intraparty disputes that arrive before the Court, it is conflict among the
leadership that matters, not conflict between the leadership as a whole and the membership.
I argue that, inside the party leadership, it is rarely the case that intraparty disputes
divide the leadership along a neat fault line between Key’s party organization and party-in-
government the way that legal scholars routinely depict it.  Instead, these disputes
incorporate elements of each on both sides of the conflict.  Both sides include likeminded
leaders from the party organization and party-in-government, cooperating together against
their fraternal rivals.  For example, the Campbell faction comprised a few government
officials and candidates and the activists aligned with them, against other Republican leaders
both in office and the party organization.  Similarly, La Follette featured a quasi-federalism
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case in which the national Democratic party clashed with the state Democratic party, with
each group including a cross-section of government officials, party activists, and other party
actors.110  These cases defy an easy categorization as intraparty conflict pitting the party-in-
government, party organization, and party-in-the-electorate against one another, each a
homogeneous, undifferentiated, and cohesive monolith, each autonomous from the others.
Party regulation cases typically feature political disputes, bringing together likeminded
members of each party segment in common cause,111 rather than institutional disputes that
split the party along functional divisions like those in Key’s trichotomy.  
The party primary cases were driven by this intraparty conflict, featuring
competition among the leadership most prominently in La Follette and Jones.  A supralegal
view of parties enables us to see that, just as the party coalition can bond together and
coordinate action when necessary, the party coalition is sufficiently loose and variegated
that it divides on important decisions about the party’s direction in ways that frequently spill
over into constitutional litigation.  Parties are not passively acted upon by party regulation;
in fact, party elements typically act through regulation to achieve their own ends. 
IV. A SUPRALEGAL THEORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES
I have argued that legal treatment of the political party is at once too narrow and too
broad.  When we view the party too narrowly, with a legal focus on the official apparatus
of the party, we fail to recognize that the essence of the party effort—the political
relationships underlying the party effort—transcend the party’s legal forms and manifest
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themselves in the private domain as necessary, sheltered from regulation.  However, when
we overestimate the degree of political cohesion within the party effort, we fail to recognize
how party actors often disagree and work against one another for relative influence.  
In section IV.A. below, I explain a supralegal approach to political parties.  I argue
that courts should adopt a skeptical approach to party regulation, specifically regulation of
party internal affairs.  First, regulation of party internal affairs is highly vulnerable to
hydraulic avoidance by political actors.  Such regulation attempts to control or prevent
coordination among leaders who have great incentive and means to devise alternate means
for continuing to work together.  The regulatory problem, then, is that they may achieve the
same ends through different means, perhaps at higher cost, but do so in ways that are less
public, less accountable, and less transparent.  
Second, when party regulation is effective, it frequently springs from attempts by
politically motivated actors who seek to alter the terms of political competition that govern
themselves and their opponents, both within and outside their party.  Party regulation biases
interparty competition, but it also skews intraparty competition and cooperation in equally
important ways, however overlooked by courts and legal scholars.  Rather than reform, the
goal of these politically motivated actors is to exploit access to government power and apply
external regulation to tilt interparty and intraparty competition in their favor.  Putative
reform of party internal affairs are more likely to achieve these narrow political aims of
advantaging certain factions than they are to achieve the broader reform goals deployed to
justify regulation.   
In section IV.B., I demonstrate the virtues of a supralegal approach to political
parties by analyzing the party primary cases in an entirely new way.  I explain how
understanding parties as bundles of political relationships helps to illuminate the party
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primary cases.  Against the legal commentary,112 I argue that the party primary cases were
decided correctly.  The Court’s decisions had the healthy effect of managing how party
actors resolve political disagreements in exactly the way that one might hope.  
A. The Need for Judicial Skepticism about Party Regulation
Courts and legal commentators turned their focus to political parties in an effort to
become less formalistic and more attentive to the political reality that parties are important
institutions.113  However, in doing so, commentators have forgotten what parties are—a
collection of cooperative relationships among political leaders in furtherance of a common
agenda.  Regulation and litigation involving political parties are attempts to re-structure the
environment in which these various political relationships play out.  We should recognize
that party regulation and litigation are exercises in political management of these
relationships, and more like regulating a family than a corporation. 
A supralegal theory of parties identifies parties as diverse aggregations of political
actors that variously both work together and oppose one another.  The implications and
considerations of party regulation varies depending on which relationships are being
affected and in what fashion, because parties fail as the single unit of analysis.  Sometimes
the invoked “party” is a broad coalition in which leaders cooperate with one another to
defeat unwanted regulation of their common mission.  However, party actors also often
divide and wield party regulation as a weapon against rivals within and outside their party.
In other words, a supralegal theory of parties conceptualizes the law regulating political
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parties as essentially regulations of how various political relationships, different in different
contexts, can be carried out legally.  Regulating parties is the equivalent of regulating
political leaders in their political coordination with one another, formal and informal in
myriad circumstances. 
First, courts should adopt a categorical approach to party regulation, choosing either
to uphold all party regulation or strike down all party regulation.  Courts are often confused
by the politics of party-related cases and struggle to understand the relevant political
dynamics at play.114  A chorus of commentators have argued that courts have performed
poorly in making case-by-case judgments about American politics, and it is difficult to
imagine significant improvement.115  However, during the age of constitutionalization of
democratic politics, courts cannot avoid party-related cases altogether.116  Even abstention
as a strategy requires courts to analyze the politics at hand and execute an effective decision
HYDRAULICS AND POLITICS OF PARTY REGULATION 51
117
 For criticism of abstention as an approach to political party cases, see section IV.B. 
118 John F. Bibby, State Party Organizations: Coping and Adapting to Candidate-Centered Politics and
Nationalization, in The Parties Respond: Changes in American Parties and Campaigns 23, 25 (L. Sandy Maisel
ed., 1998) 
not to decide and to retain the status quo.117  A case-by-case judicial approach to party
regulation would require courts to choose among different party regulations and decide
winners and losers in intraparty and interparty competition.  Any such nuanced approach
with respect to party regulation forces courts to make difficult normative judgments about
the political process for which they lack legitimacy and to make difficult empirical
judgments about political dynamics that they are not well-prepared to identify.  A
categorical approach, if engineered properly, permits courts to apply rule-based doctrine that
achieves structurally sound outcomes, but avoids undue dependence on judicial analysis of
the details of the supralegal party and party regulation in each case. 
Second, instead of upholding all party regulation, courts ought to scrutinize closely
and ultimately strike down party regulation that attempts to dictate the internal affairs of
political parties, their leadership structure and decisionmaking in particular.  Such
lawmaking, like regulation of the primary franchise and the political party’s organizational
hierarchy, is extensive and attempts “to mold state parties into quasi-public agencies and to
limit party leaders’ flexibility in devising strategies to achieve organizational goals.”118  The
underlying purpose is to control coordination and competition among party leaders who
already possess terrific incentives to reach agreement among themselves on their own.
Lawmaking in these areas thus intervenes and tries to disrupt the political dynamics that
would drive party leaders to informal accommodation. 
Regulation of party internal affairs is most likely to fall prey to the hydraulics of
party regulation.  When external regulation forces party leaders toward undesirable
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outcomes in these areas, party leaders will unify in opposition and avoid regulation through
hydraulic strategems.  While regulation may influence how the party conducts its business,
it does so in a limited way as it encourages the party simply to achieve the same ends
through different means outside of its legal apparatus.  Even as regulation forces changes
in party activity, it also comes with a cost.  Political activity emigrates from the public
sphere of the political party’s legal structure to the less regulated, private sphere where
accountability and transparency are far less.  
When regulation of party internal affairs is most effective, it all too often was
sponsored by the party in power to the competitive disadvantage of its opponents.  In these
cases, like Tashjian, party regulation tends to favor, and thus insulate, the majority party by
tilting the terms of partisan competition in the majority’s direction.  The majority party can
leverage its control of government to secure its place in power.119  Of course, not all party
regulation is so obviously motivated by partisan purposes as in Tashjian, nor so clearly
unfair and damaging to partisan competition.  But the significant risk of such a scenario as
the prelude to party regulation justifies judicial skepticism.  The potential consequence of
insulating the majority party in power is highly costly, and by definition, unlikely to self-
correct through the political process.  
Third, judicial skepticism remains warranted in other instances as well.  Party
regulation just as often results when one intraparty faction enacts advantageous legal
parameters that advance that faction over other intraparty rivals.  In these cases, the major
consideration is not partisan fairness—instead, regulation is being wielded as a weapon in
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intraparty politics.  Competing party leaders have engaged in strategic behavior to apply
external regulation to win intraparty disputes over the party’s internal affairs and
decisionmaking.  Ironically, these instances are when regulation is most likely to influence
party affairs, although only until disadvantaged party actors countermobilize in what
promises to be an ongoing hydraulic exchange.  Regulation here becomes destabilizing and
both triggers and facilitates a spiral of responses in which party actors use lawmaking to
outmaneuver and overpower their rivals.  
Fourth, courts should be generally suspicious of reform interests advanced to justify
any form of party regulation.  Recall that reform goals are likely to be substantially
undermined by the hydraulics of party regulation.  No one should know better than these
party actors of what they expect party regulation to accomplish in their quest for advantage,
and no one should know better than they about the hydraulics of party regulation.  Political
disputes over party regulation are always cloaked in the language of constitutional law and
democratic theory when they land in court.  But whatever the stated reform rationales, party
regulation is likely to be motivated by partisan goals, not reform ones.120  When partisan
goals dictate a change in policy, party regulation will so be reversed later on.  In other
words, party regulation is as often an obstacle or opponent of reform as an ally.     
Party actors seek not to reform the other party, or their own, but to place heavier
costs on their opponents’ optimal ways of doing business.  In other words, lawmakers care
little about democratizing political parties in the abstract.  Lawmakers care little if their
opponents band together supralegally and the hydraulics of party regulation take effect.
Assuming the hydraulics process occurs successfully, their opponents may manage to
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reinstate previous outcomes by resorting to new tactics.  However, the hydraulic process is
likely to force those opponents to discard their first-best method of operation for less
efficient ones, even if they arrive at similar end results.  If correctly calculated, those
opponents will be forced to spend more resources for the same payoff.  As a consequence,
a likely outcome of reform regulation in these cases is that (i) regulation will be successful
in achieving the political purposes of disadvantaging opponents; but (ii) regulation will be
much less successful in achieving the reform purposes allegedly underlying the effort in the
first place. 
Once we view parties essentially as bundles of myriad relationships, the structural
concern is how best to manage these relationships toward a healthy balance of cooperation
and competition.  As I have explained, party conflict spreads beyond political
accommodation when one faction enlists state law in the form of regulation to trump its
rivals.  Those rivals then return fire by petitioning the courts for a different form of legal
trump to override the original legislative victory.121  Judicial decisions are best seen as but
one step in a continuing series of attempts by one faction to gain advantage over another.
Judicial solicitude toward party regulation encourages this cycle, motivating party actors to
seek victory via state law trumps through the legislature in the first place and then
motivating their rivals to reverse those victories in the courthouse. 
Judicial skepticismabout party regulation wards off these spirals and forces political
rivals to negotiate a political compromise, rather than trying to trump one another through
state law.  In this way, courts can help provide a framework for the lasting resolution of the
underlying political dispute.  Once we view parties in terms of the constant tension inherent
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in their constituent political relationships, we can understand how the main goal of courts
is to help manage competition among party actors and stave off spiraling rivalries, rather
than trying vainly to impose a final settlement on party factions that will never stick.
Skepticism toward party regulation is more likely to produce a general equilibrium
settlement of conflict, achieving new structural benefits of stability and party cohesion, and
less likely to produce unstable partial equilibrium settlements that will be quickly undone
in the statehouse or after another trip to court.  
In the following section, grounded in the supralegal theory of political parties, I
offer an alternate construction of the primary cases.  I disregard the Court’s express
rationales and contend that the Court’s actual resolution of the party primary cases could be
understood as acting on a clear understanding of the underlying politics and the relevant
political relationships.  Under this alternative approach, the question in the party primary
cases could be re-framed to show how party autonomy helps induce a final resolution of the
intraparty leadership disputes occurring in the cases, rather than provide the next step in a
continuing sequence of moves. 
I explain how the Court’s decisions in the party primary cases, effectively, albeit
unintentionally, helped determine how political leaders would decide the fate of their
party—collectively in internal party negotiations, rather than in a courtroom or state
legislature, through political consensus rather than through a legal trump.  In cases featuring
party conflict, losing litigants are likely to continue maneuvering in the statehouse or the
courtroom in perpetuation of the ongoing dispute. 
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B.   Re-thinking the Party Primary Cases Through a Supralegal Lens
Once we view party cases in terms of political conflict and cooperation among
different factions of party actors, the Court’s doctrine of party autonomy in the party
primary cases can be re-framed as an implicit choice in favor of political resolution of
intraparty disagreements.  The outcomes of the decisions, if not their reasoning, were
focused on the proper relationships motivating the disputes at heart of each case.  
As a practical matter, courts face a decision in party cases about how party actors,
when they disagree, will decide among themselves important choices regarding the party’s
message, internal procedures, ideological agenda, and political strategy.  Courts choose the
forum in which party leaders will compete with one another, but ultimately decide for
themselves, the party’s collective direction.  The Court’s decisions had the healthy effect
of managing how intraparty disputants carry out their disagreements in exactly the way that
one might hope if the Court was trying to manage intraparty competition.  In sum, the Court
could be seen as seeing clearly the leadership relationships in these cases and focusing on
setting up a framework for healthy conflict resolution, rather than fixating on the “party” as
a single entity to be acted upon.    
As I have explained, a party is a common enterprise in which the constituent
factions benefit from coordination and intend to collaborate, but each faction also wants the
party’s collective effort to move closer to its individual preference.  Parties are characterized
by this drive toward cooperation, tempered by factionalization.  Unlike a corporation, a
party in practice consists of diverse, loosely affiliated actors whom the titular leadership and
official organization cannot command by fiat.122  A party cannot resolve its disputes by
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coercing acquiescence on any side of an intraparty dispute.  Instead, intraparty factions try
to reach a political accommodation that satisfies their interests and allows them to cooperate
as a party.  
However, when the party is subject to state law commands, each intraparty faction
has individual incentive to use the coercive force of state law to dictate cooperation on their
terms from intraparty rivals.  Party actors seek to terminate difficult intraparty disputes by
using state regulation of the party to force their fraternal rivals to acquiesce.  
The effect of the Court’s decisions, whether or not the Court intended it, was to
force the opposing intraparty factions once again to engage one another politically.123  The
Court struck the state laws and thereby removed the possibility of a state law trump in these
intraparty fights.124  This party autonomy from state regulation meant that the party was left
to govern itself extralegally in the fluid, polyarchic realm of party politics.  Party leaders
must once again deal with one another politically, despite their differences, and develop a
consensus that the party leaders can collectively accept.  In La Follette, when one party
faction disagreed with the rest of the party regarding party policy, the Court directed the
dissenting group to address its arguments to the rest of the party, “not to the judiciary.”125
The party primary cases reinforced party cohesion and stability by refusing to grant
victory to any single party faction through judicial decision or state law.  Party leaders are
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127 Contrary to the legal scholarship, the main problem with entrenched duopoly is that it stifles
intraparty competition, not interparty competition.  Legal scholars might be correct that Duverger’s Law
precludes consistent national success for a third party, but Duverger’s Law does not preclude the possibility that
an individual candidate, either an independent or minor-party nominee, can defeat the major party candidates in
a given election.  The logic of Duverger’s Law, that votes for a third-place contestant ought instead to supply the
winning margin for one of the top two finishers, does not dictate that the major parties will necessarily be the top
two finishers in every election, particularly not when there is a strong candidate from outside the major parties
also in the running.  
In other words, what matters for Duverger’s Law in a particular election is the candidate’s relative
ranking within that election, not the overall national prestige of the candidate’s party.  If a strong candidate
held together by common goals and strategic interests, and likewise they must resolve their
disagreements consistent with their common goals and interests if the party is to remain
cohesive going forward.  In addition, the doctrine of party autonomy also insulated other
parties and permitted each party to control its affairs, rather than stand subject to the state
law commands of whatever party controls state government.  The Court’s decisions thus
encouraged, perhaps forced, all party leaders to cooperate through consensus instead of
seeking unequivocal victory through the brute force of law.126
Focused on the party as the unit of analysis, it is unsurprising that legal scholars
have failed to recognize fully how party regulation is so frequently the product of intraparty
leadership competition.  They have focused primarily on interparty competition as the
predominant political dynamic in party cases and have hoped to leverage interparty
competition as a means of drawing out a healthy, responsive democratic politics.127  By
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decided to run against both major parties as a third-party nominee, strategic voting under Duverger’s Law would
not necessarily injure him, and in fact, might even help him.  If John McCain ran in 2000 as a third-party
candidate, strategic voters might choose between McCain and the stronger of Bush or Gore, rather than waste
their votes on the third-place candidate.  Indeed, Teddy Roosevelt finished second in his 1912 presidential run
as the Bull Moose party’s nominee, ahead of incumbent Republican president Howard Taft, in what was “a battle
only between Roosevelt and [Democrat Woodrow] Wilson.”  Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, & Edward H.
Lazarus, Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure 86 (1995). 
“Intraparty” competition is simply a shorthand for serious competition among serious politicians.
Serious politicians tend to reside almost exclusively within the major parties, and they compete with each other
both inside of and across party lines.  Regulation that frustrates politicians’ ability to jump to another party is to
limit the scope of competition among serious politicians.  Competition among them that might spill over from
intraparty competition to new interparty competition is prevented.  Party regulation seals up competition within
and between the major parties, preserving their centrality, and it does so by blocking opportunities for political
action that at least some major-party politicians, namely those who lose intraparty struggles, would like to
preserve.  
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contrast, legal scholars have generally neglected intraparty competition and underestimated
its intensity and importance.  Parties hardly represent monolithic political interests and are
instead provisional coalitions among leaders who share some common goals but also possess
conflicting interests that help drive the politics of party regulation.  
In the party primary cases, the Court strayed from the prescription of the two lonely
legal scholars who have considered intraparty conflict in party cases.  Daniel Lowenstein
argues that courts should not intervene in internal party disputes because neither the party
organization nor the party-in-government has stronger claim to speak for the party.  “The
only way to discern the true voice of ‘the party’ is to permit the political process to work
itself out and then to examine the results.”128  Elizabeth Garrett likewise reasons that “courts
should decline to referee an internal dispute” because “[n]o segment of the party is
powerless in such a dispute.”129  She argues that party elements are capable of fending for
themselves and competing on equal footing to enact law that reflects their preferences.  The
party-in-government controls legislative power, but the party organization controls internal
party policy and important resources necessary for the election of the party-in-government,
while the party-in-the-electorate wields influence in its voting power and direct democracy.
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Both Lowenstein and Garrett advise the Court to abstain from almost any intraparty dispute
because intraparty disputants are equally influential in party affairs and can settle their
disagreement without help. 
Lowenstein and Garrett rely on a mistaken premise that judicial abstention creates
a neutral and level playing field on which intraparty disputants can best reach political
accommodation.  To the contrary, judicial abstention itself is not neutral.130  It creates
advantages and disadvantages—namely, by letting party regulation stand, abstention
empowers those who can exercise state law as a legal trump in intraparty disputes.  It
therefore advantages leaders who have closer access to legislative power and gives them
incentive to exercise such trumps over their opponents, rather than seek informal political
agreement.  Competing disputants will engage ongoing hydraulic maneuvers as they pursue
and fend off party regulation in an attempt to overpower each other through the force of law.
As a result, judicial abstention is likely to encourage intraparty division and discourage
political agreement.  Lowenstein and Garrett argue that judicial abstention pushes party
actors to engage in accommodating give-and-take, but judicial abstention, by letting state
regulation stand, actually tends to preempt political accommodation.
Indeed, to the degree that any political faction succeeds in using state regulation to
defeat its intraparty rivals, the effect is to push those rivals out of the party as the party
ceases to serve their interests.  It would be reasonable for courts adjudicating such intraparty
leadership divisions over party affairs to require informal accommodation among important
party leaders, who would be forced to shape the party in ways that serve their common
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interests.  Under this view, internal resolution of intraparty disputes could be seen as more
likely to result in lasting, mutually beneficial accommodation than the continued temptation
of, and appeal to, state law trumps.   
Party autonomy also yields political accommodation through a simple rule for courts
to apply.  Party autonomy in these cases, and judicial skepticism about party regulation in
general, works through the familiar doctrine of associational rights, without requiring the
Court to grapple with the complex politics of each case.  Party autonomy does not require
an exemption of political parties as a special category of expressive association entitled to
a special presumption of judicial abstention.  In contrast, an abstention approach requires
a potentially vexing determination of whether a particular case is a “political party case” in
which the structure and regulation of political parties is central, rather than a case dealing
with associational rights for which traditional doctrine would instead apply.131  More
important, Garrett’s abstention proposal requires courts to differentiate between party
regulation that constitutes fair politics, for which courts would abstain, and party regulation
that constitutes legislative entrenchment in a way that reinstates a need for judicial
intervention.132  Party autonomy, though not without complication, is a simpler approach that
requires less of courts.  In the party primary cases, associational rights serve as a familiar
doctrinal approach that courts could apply in a routine fashion, with the interest in fostering
internal conflict  resolution automatically impounded within it.
Indeed, the Court followed an analogous doctrinal strategy with respect to other
types of expressive associations.  In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,133 the Court ruled that
the Boy Scouts could expel a scoutmaster on the basis of his homosexuality.  The Boy
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Scouts claimed that it was part of its core expression that “homosexual conduct is not
morally straight.”134  Dale’s continuing service as a scoutmaster in the Boy Scouts would
contradict that core message “because his presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very
least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world,
that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”135  What
is noteworthy for our purposes is that the Court deferred to the Boy Scouts official
leadership in determining what constituted the Boy Scouts core expressive mission.  Despite
ambiguous evidence on the point, the Court accepted without scrutiny the titular
leadership’s assertion that opposition to homosexuality was central to the Scouts’
philosophy.136  The Court reasoned that “it is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s
expressed values.”137  In short, even if members of the group disagree, “[t]he Boy Scouts
takes an official position with respect to homosexual conduct, and that is sufficient for First
Amendment purposes.”138
The Court’s deference to the organization’s official position forces the Boy Scout
members to resolve their disagreements internally.  Members of the Boy Scouts may
disagree with the official position taken by Boy Scout officials and accepted at face value
by the Court.  However, the Court’s deference to the Scouts official position meant that
dissenters within the Boy Scouts would need to work within the organization to change its
policy.  The Court would provide dissenters no help from outside.  The Dale decision can
be read, not as empowering expressive associations to exclude outsiders at will, but as
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requiring intraorganizational resolution of internal disputes as the means by which the group
determines organization policy, including whether to exclude outsiders at all.139
However, the Court’s treatment of political parties would be necessarily different
than for other types of expressive associations, because political parties are at their heart
informal coalitions rather than formal organizations.  As I explained when describing the
hydraulics of party regulation, political parties are best understood, not as limited to an
official party organization or its nominees, but instead as a larger supralegal network of
roughly likeminded political elites who pursue overlapping goals through the party’s
collective agenda.  The party is best characterized as an informal alliance among diverse
political actors not necessarily tied to the official party structure. 
Even if the Court wished simply to endorse the leadership’s position within the
party, there was not a monolithic leadership that the Court could identify.  Nor was there a
single procedure for the party leaders to decide internally how to resolve party
disagreements, unlike the Boy Scouts or the Rotary Club.  In Jones, Campbell’s use of the
ballot measure process went outside the party apparatus, but he still represented an
important leadership faction within his party and it was legitimate for him to use the process
to win his preferred party procedures.  In party cases, the Court is asked to weigh competing
leadership claims for control in the absence of a clear leadership position to endorse.  Rather
than choose among the claims, the Court could be understood to have done the next best
thing by punting the questions back to the political arena for party leaders to resolve
informally.  
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This interpretation contradicts the standard reading of the party primary cases as
simply upholding a party’s collective right to exclude its dissenting members.  For example,
Michael Paulsen argues that “[t]he freedom of expressive association entails the right to
control membership in order to control message, and this entails, under [La Follette], a right
to exclude not only competing messages but competing members who might seek, over time,
to alter the expressive content of the group.”140  However, my interpretation of the party
primary cases is that the central intraparty disagreement was among party leaders, without
materially involving the rank-and-file members.  Just as in Dale, the Court decided the party
primary cases “without any consideration of the views or rights of the members.”141  Under
Paulsen’s reading, the party primary cases must hinge on whether party leaders can exclude
other party leaders who disagree.  I contend that the Court was not picking sides in an
intraparty dispute.  Instead, the Court prescribed the process by which party leaders should
resolve their internal disputes.   
A doctrine of party autonomy from state regulation, the opposite of judicial
abstention, induces political solutions.  Leaders within the same party are pushed to find
agreement, rather than trying perpetually to codify their side of a disagreement into state law
by different means.  The debate about the party regulation cases is seen most clearly when
framed as a discussion about how best to force intraparty disputes to be resolved politically,
outside the courtroom.142
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Viewing the party primary cases in this light would be impossible without looking
past the party as the relevant actor in question and understanding parties as diffuse
aggregations of numerous diverse factions that bind together and oppose one another in
turns.  Discarding the party as the critical unit of analysis enables a more accurate,
politically realistic perspective on the structural considerations in play.  Looking past the
party offers the most constructive re-interpretation of the Court’s handling of the party
primary cases and best accomplishes the structural aim of forcing party actors to resolve
conflicts politically.  
V.   CONCLUSION
I have presented a new supralegal conception of political parties as diffuse
collections of political relationships, different sets of which are implicated in different
settings and different cases.  Political parties are flexible alliances among political leaders
who work together at times and against each other at times.  This approach breaks sharply
from the traditional focus on the party as a legal entity regulated by the state and from the
usual regulatory emphasis on the legal apparatus of political parties.  
This basic shift in the way we think about political parties is the main contribution
of the article, one whose importance should grow as courts and lawmakers continue to
expand regulation of democratic politics.  In this article, I have applied a supralegal
approach to advocate skepticism about regulation of party internal affairs.  First, the fluid
structure of political coalitions undergirding parties suggests that regulatory efforts often
will fail as party leaders find ways to shift to less public, and less transparent, methods of
achieving coordination and cooperation.  Second, to the degree that party regulation
succeeds, it too often results from the efforts of party leaders to bias the rules of political
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competition against their rivals.  Party reform is more likely to achieve these self-interested
strategic aims than it is to achieve the broader reform goals deployed to justify regulation.
Judicial skepticism denies political actors the use of state law and litigation as cudgels
against one another in essentially political disputes.
This article also represents a first step in a larger project of reconceptualizing the
political party throughout the study and practice of election law.  Richard Pildes explains
in the most recent Harvard Law Review Foreword that the Supreme Court has adopted the
central role in structuring American democracy.143   Political parties are central pieces in the
Court’s structural challenge, and a supralegal approach to parties carries consequences for
nearly every question that the Court faces in this vein.  An immediate example is the
complication that a supralegal approach to recent developments in campaign finance reform.
A supralegal approach suggests that parties extend far beyond their legal apparatuses as
party actors act together far beyond those bounds in response to regulation.  The “shadow
party” of independent organizations is part and parcel of the political party, just as it always
has been.  However, a supralegal approach also counsels that campaign finance regulation
may be doomed to failure as a reform effort.  We must consider the politics of campaign
finance reform and how party leaders use it to advance their interests in political
competition.  This article lays a foundation for such an analysis in campaign finance
regulation and throughout election law.  
